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ABSTRACT 
 
Little is known about the effect of border costs on FDI location.  This paper explores this for 
the fifth European Union (EU) enlargement that integrated the Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEECs).  It regresses count data for 35,105 FDI projects locating in 25 European 
countries over the period 1997-2010.  Four EU accession events are examined for the more- 
and less-liberalized CEECs.  It finds that the lower border costs doubled FDI in the CEECs at 
membership, but of which 60% is diverted from the ‘old’ Europe.  This membership effect is 
three-times greater for the more-liberalized countries, but earlier events are unimportant.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There is considerable research on how border costs affect trade (McCallum, 1995; Anderson 
and Wincoop, 2004; Coughlin and Novy, 2012), but relatively little on how these costs affect 
foreign direct investment (FDI).  Standard theory predicts that horizontal FDI is discouraged 
when trade costs fall, but Neary (2009) notes that this conflicts with recent experience where 
trade liberalization is associated with a strong increase in FDI.  A major reason for this is the 
formation of trade blocs, with firms establishing greenfield plants abroad as low-cost export-
platforms (see Ekholm et al., 2007; Krugman and Venables, 1990).  Integration may also lead 
to brownfield FDI if a multinational enterprise (MNE) consolidates its plants (Neary, 2008). 
Despite this theory, there is little empirical evidence on how border costs affect FDI location. 
This paper remedies this deficiency by drawing on the experience of the fifth enlargement of 
the European Union (EU) to examine how the lower border costs affected FDI location.  This 
enlargement added more than 100 million citizens to this trade bloc from the ten countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe (the ‘CEECs’), creating the world’s largest single market.1   
The enlargement removed the internal border checks for the new accession countries 
in the form of waiting time and administrative costs (Hornok, 2008).  These are difficult to 
measure, but in aggregate they are estimated to be around ten per cent of the trade costs of the 
CEECs with the ‘old’ Europe (Edwards, 2008).  Membership did not involve substantial tariff 
reduction, as these were agreed under the earlier Association Agreements, while the technical 
and non-tariff barriers (i.e. regulations and product standards) also did not change sharply at 
this time.  The accession process lasted up to seven years from the start of negotiations until 
membership and the economic and political liberalization of the CEECs was integral to this.  
This poses a potential threat to identification but the approach of this paper is to focus on key 
                                                        
1 The CEECs are the ten former communist states that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, i.e. mainly Eastern Bloc 
countries west of the former Soviet Union, plus the Baltic States.  The former Yugoslavia was not part of this 
Bloc, but Slovenia joined in 2004 and so is included.  Croatia joined in a sixth enlargement in 2013. 
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accession events and to examine these for more- and less-liberalized CEECs.  From this it is 
possible to infer that the effect of the lower border costs occurs at membership.  In particular, 
if EU membership is just a commitment to future liberalization then we would expect a larger 
effect for the less-liberalized countries.  Further, if FDI locates to anticipate the lower border 
costs at membership then we would expect the earlier accession events to be important.   
The FDI data are sourced from the European Investment Monitor, which is compiled 
by Ernst and Young (see Defever, 2012).  This comprises information on 35,105 cross-border 
investments locating in the ten CEECs and fifteen incumbent Member States (‘EU15’) over 
1997-2010.  These are greenfield and brownfield FDI, where the latter is a re-investment by a 
MNE at its existing plant.  The data are analyzed as project counts for each country and year 
using a fixed effects panel regression for the twenty-five countries.  Four accession events are 
examined: the commencement of negotiations; European Council commitment to enlarge; the 
conclusion to negotiations at which the membership date was announced; and membership.  
These are evaluated separately for the more- and less-liberalized CEECs, where these entered 
the accession process at different times owing to their different liberalization.  A contribution 
of the paper is to examine the extent to which the FDI location is diverted to the CEECs from 
the EU15.  It involves regressing a log-linear model for both the share and level of projects. 
The error structure allows for the smaller level of FDI in the CEECs and for the possibility of 
any inefficiency in data collection in the CEECs prior to the accession negotiations. 
Overall, the paper finds that EU membership had a substantial effect on the FDI in the 
CEECs, more than doubling the number of the projects locating in these countries compared 
to before the commencement of the accession negotiations.   As other changes were relatively 
unimportant at this time then this is due to the lower border costs from the removal of border 
checks that led to a reduction in waiting time and administrative costs.  The FDI effect varies 
with the liberalization of a country, so that the increase in FDI location is three-times greater 
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for the more-liberalized CEECs.  It is also greater for less-liberalized CEECs in the run-up to 
membership, which is consistent with their liberalization under the enlargement process.  The 
net effect of FDI location for the EU is much smaller as 60% of the projects in the CEECs at 
membership were diverted.  Nevertheless, the lower border costs had a substantial impact on 
FDI location in the CEECs, but which depends on the level of liberalization. 
The next section describes the key accession events and the nature of the border costs.  
Section 3 discusses the empirical framework and Section 4 outlines the nature of the FDI and 
other data.  Section 5 presents the regression results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. EU ACCESSION AND THE BORDER COSTS 
 
Following the collapse of communism a formal set of criteria for the EU membership of the 
CEECs was set out in June 1993.  These are the Copenhagen criteria that embody conditions 
related to political and economic liberalization (Christoffersen, 2007).2  The criteria for the 
political liberalization of a CEEC had to be satisfied before the negotiations could commence 
with it, whereas the economic liberalization measures had to be implemented by membership 
and enforced thereafter, so these were part of the negotiations.  Applications for membership 
were received from the CEECs over 1994-96, and four key accession events are identified in 
Table 1.  The events vary in their timing according to a three-fold classification of the CEECs 
that is the same grouping used by Bevin and Estrin (2004), except that Slovenia is included.  
The groups also differ by their liberalization, which is useful for our identification strategy. 
 
 [Table 1 here] 
                                                        
2  The political criterion concerns a stable institutional set-up to guarantee democracy, rule of law and protection 
of human rights, whereas the other two criteria relate to a fully functioning market economy and the acceptance 
of EU law, but which together correspond to economic liberalization (Rode and Gwartney, 2012).  In the run-up 
to negotiations the 1994 Essen Pre-Accession Strategy helped the CEECs prepare for the Single Market through 
structured relationships with the EU’s institutions and the gradual adoption of EU law. 
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In relation to liberalization, the CEECs were screened in the run-up to a 1997 Luxembourg 
Summit of European Ministers, and following this the negotiations commenced with five of 
these, which (with Cyprus) were known as the Luxembourg Group (Table 1).  The other five 
CEECs were judged to be not sufficiently liberalized either to satisfy the economic criteria in 
the medium-term or in the case of Slovakia on the basis of its political liberalization, so that 
these are the less-liberalized countries.  Their negotiations followed a 2000 Helsinki Summit, 
and (with Malta) they were known as the Helsinki Group.  As regards the accession events in 
Table 1, a 2000 Road Map sped-up negotiations with some of the Helsinki Group, such that a 
commitment to enlarge was made at a 2001 Laeken European Summit (Christoffersen, 2007).  
This approved plans to bring the negotiations with eight of the CEECs to a close by the end 
of 2002.  A further European Council meeting announced that enlargement would take place 
in May 2004.  A timetable was agreed for Bulgaria and Romania, and at the Brussels Council 
meeting in December 2004 it was announced that they would join in 2007 (see Table 1). 
 
2.1. Border Costs and FDI Location 
 
EU membership gives full access to the European Single Market, which is more complete for 
goods than services and brings obligations concerning the free movement of goods, services, 
capital and people (Egan, 2015).  Since its establishment in January 1993 the Single Market 
has sought to dismantle internal trade barriers by removing the tariffs, technical trade barriers 
(e.g., regulations on consumer protection, health and safety and the environment), non-tariff 
barriers (i.e. product standards) and border controls between the Member States.  Association 
Agreements, known as Europe Agreements, were signed with the CEECs over 1991-96 and 
these phased out statutory EU tariffs on industrial goods (Baldwin et al., 1997).  Remaining 
tariffs and restrictions were removed at membership, but these mainly affected agriculture, 
while a common EU external tariff was introduced as part of the customs union.   
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The main benefit for trade between the CEECs and EU15 at membership, and hence 
for export-orientated FDI, was the reduction in border costs, which removed internal border 
checks (Hornok, 2008).  Hummel et al. (2007) estimate that the cost of a day’s waiting is the 
same as an ad valorem tariff of 0.8%, but in addition the administration costs were substantial 
and compounded when crossing several borders.  Technical and non-tariff barriers were less 
important at this time, especially if the firm was already located in or trading with the Single 
Market.  Many technical barriers were agreed prior to negotiations and Chen (2004) finds that 
non-tariff barriers had no effect on trade within the EU15.  Other integration measures were 
also unimportant since the Euro was adopted by only two CEECs by 2010 and the Schengen 
Agreement on the movement of individuals did not apply to the CEECs until 2007. 
In aggregate, the border costs are estimated to be 5% to 20% of trade costs for many 
industries in the CEECs relative to the EU15 (Edwards, 2008), averaging around 10%.  While 
the proximity-concentration hypothesis suggests horizontal FDI takes place when production 
costs in the host country are low and trade costs are high, Lankes and Venables (1996) argue 
that a reduction in trade costs will be the major benefit for FDI location.  This is because the 
new accession countries offer a low-cost production site and the lower border costs improves 
access to the European markets (Krugman and Venables, 1990).  Thus, not only may FDI in 
the CEECs reflect a vertical motive for FDI, but from a horizontal perspective it may be an 
export-platform (Ekholm et al., 2007).  EU enlargement may also favour plant consolidation 
(Neary, 2008), whereby plants are closed or investment is foregone elsewhere in the union. 
 The empirical evidence for the effect of the lower border costs mainly relates to trade 
(see Magerman et al. 2015).  Otherwise the evidence for FDI location in the CEECs is largely 
in the lead-up to enlargement and so prior to membership.  Perhaps the most cited study is by 
Bevan and Estrin (2004), who find a positive and significant estimate for an ordinal dummy 
for the CEECs that are most likely to accede (3, 2 and 1 for the groups in Table 1).  Clausing 
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and Dorobantu (2005) examine EU announcements prior to negotiations and they find that 
the Copenhagen criteria had a significant effect on FDI in both the Luxembourg and Helsinki 
Groups, but that the negotiations format is important for the latter group only, so that it could 
just be a commitment to liberalization.  Flam and Nordström (2007) find the Single Market 
increased FDI by 85% between 1995-98 and 2002-06, but do not identify the CEECs.  Using 
US-EU trade data Ekholm et al. (2007) find support for the export-platform motive. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
To estimate the effect of EU accession on FDI location the model is specified as:  
 
,     (1) 
 
where FDIit is the count of the number of investment projects in country i at year t, EUit are 
dummies for the four accession events in Table 1, xit are country-level controls, i are country 
fixed effects and it is the error term.  The FDIt term is measured contemporaneously with the 
dependent variable, but reverse causality is rejected below.  Equation (1) is regressed using a 
fixed effects panel estimation across the ten CEECs and fifteen EU15 Members States, where 
together these are referred to as the ‘EU25’.  The annual mean count of projects per country 
is 100 projects, so equation (1) is a good approximation to the Poisson model.  It is preferred 
to a conditional logit model that is much less flexible for examining location over time.  
The semi-log specification of (1) is advantageous in enabling the diversion of FDI to 
be explored.  In particular, when  = 0 the term for the total number of projects locating in the 
EU25 in year t (i.e. ln FDIt) is omitted and (1) is an equation in the ‘FDI level’.  However, if 
 ≠ 0 then (1) is an equation in the ‘FDI share’, which can be seen by rearranging (1) as: 
ititititit FDIxEUFDI    ln'ln 11
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.    (1) 
 
Appendix A shows that regressing (1) both as a level and a share the ratio of the  estimates 
for each accession terms reveals the proportion of projects that would otherwise have located 
elsewhere in the EU25.  It also shows that for each accession term the  estimate is no greater 
for the share compared to the level, so that this ratio is bounded above by unity.  In each case 
the  estimate measures a proportionate effect, which for a dummy variable is exp  - 1.  As 
the FDI share lies on the unit interval equation (1) is also regressed using a logistic function, 
and this involves replacing ln (FDIit / FDIt) with ln (FDIit / (FDIt - FDIit)).
3   
The estimating equation does not include time fixed effects.  These are meaningless if 
(1) is regressed as an FDI share as it is not possible for an unobserved effect to either increase 
or decrease the share in every region in some year.  Further, if (1) is regressed as an FDI level 
it is not possible to implement the methodology since in this case the EUit terms capture a net 
FDI location effect in the CEECs over and above that of the EU15.  It is zero if, for example, 
enlargement gives confidence to investors in the EU15 and increases FDI in these countries 
in the same proportion, as the effect is picked-up by a time fixed effect.  As we see, including 
time fixed effects in the level regression gives similar results to the FDI share as they capture 
the ln FDIt term.  Econometrically, the omission of time fixed effects can be justified as the 
controls xit vary greatly across countries, but little over time, implying that these fixed effects 
have large standard errors and are imprecisely determined (Allison, 2009).  It is also difficult 
to think of any time fixed effects that simultaneously affect FDI location in the EU25 and the 
timing of the accession events, since the latter is governed by the negotiation process. 
                                                        
3 Let p be the project share, then the inverse of the logistic function, p = 1 / (1 + 1 / exp z)), is the log-odds ratio, 
ln (p / (1 - p)) = z, where z is the right-hand side of (1).  If p = FDIit / FDIt then ln (FDIit / (FDIt - FDIit) = z. 
  itititit
t
it FDIxEU
FDI
FDI
 






 ln1'ln 11
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The hypothesis that is investigated is that the EU membership term captures the effect 
of the lower border costs.  This is explored by estimating the EUit accession terms for each of 
the Luxembourg and Helsinki Groups.  As we have seen, these had different entry dates into 
the accession process that reflected their level of liberalization, and this enables inferences to 
be drawn.  If membership is a commitment to future liberalization we expect a larger estimate 
to be found for the less-liberalized CEECs.  Further, if FDI locates to anticipate the lower 
border costs the announcement terms should be significant, including for the more-liberalized 
CEECs.  In these respects, the end of negotiations is an important event since the membership 
date was announced at this time.  The accession announcements are likely to be a useful way 
of capturing the liberalizing effect of the EU accession process in the less-liberalized CEECs 
as they signal progress in meeting the Copenhagen criteria for liberalization. 
 
3.1. Estimation Approach 
 
The FDI data are part-sourced from national investment agencies, but if weaker institutions in 
the CEECs prior to accession mean that they under-report FDI then this will bias upwards the 
 estimates in equation (1).  To address this potential inefficiency in FDI data collection, it in 
(1) is specified as a compound normal-half normal error term (Aigner et al., 1977).  This is a 
widely used stochastic frontier model.  Letting it = vit - uit, where vit ~ N(0, v2), uit = |Uit| and 
Uit = N(0, u2), the log-likelihood function is specified as (Greene, 2011):4 
 
lnL = -
n
2
ln
2
p
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷-
n
2
ln s 2( ) -
1
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eit
s
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷
t
å
i
å
2
+ lnF
-eitl
s
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷
t
å
i
å ,  (2) 
 
                                                        
4 A potential difficulty with the stochastic frontier model is the ‘wrong skew’ problem (see Simar and Wilson, 
2010), but the residuals from the OLS estimation of (1) are negatively skewed, so that u2 is identified.  The 
normality of v is accepted in the literature and Greene (1990) finds no difference between the main alternatives 
for u.  Estimation of (1) using the frontier command in Stata fails to converge if ln FDIt is included. 
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where 2  u2 + v2,   u / v and  is the cumulative standard normal distribution.  By 
letting the error variances depend on i and t, and hence on the accession events EUit, then it is 
possible to test and control for a possible inefficiency in FDI data collection:   
 
0 ituuuit EU      and    0 itvvvit EU .   (3) 
 
The first of these allows the variance of the half normal term to vary with accession.  If there 
is a general inefficiency in data collection then u > 0, and if it is greater for the CEECs prior 
to an event EUit then u < 0.  The second corrects for heteroskedasticity since if the CEECs 
get a relatively lower level of FDI prior to membership, it is expected that v < 0.  Equation 
(2) is regressed using maximum likelihood (Gould et al., 2010), where  is given by (1) and 
the error variances  and  by (3).  In fact, the u and u estimates do not differ significantly 
from zero, which means that (2) is subsequently regressed with u = 0 (i.e. 2  v2 and  = 
0), so that it is normally distributed.5  When v = 0 this gives identical parameter estimates to 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), albeit with smaller standard errors owing to the correction for 
the degrees of freedom.  However, there are advantages from maximum likelihood regression 
as it enables us to correct for the smaller level and share of FDI in the CEECs prior to each of 
the accession events, including EU membership (see Table 2 below). 
 
4. DATA AND VARIABLES 
 
The FDI data are from the European Investment Monitor (EIM), which gives details of cross-
border investment in the EU25 from 1997.  It comprises greenfield and brownfield FDI that 
                                                        
5 The normality of ln FDIit is not rejected by the data (Jarque-Bera = 2.97; 20.10 = 4.61).  Regressing the model 
using OLS it is necessary to increase four project counts from 1 to 2 to ensure that the skewness-kurtosis test for 
normality is satisfied for the residuals (Jarque-Bera = 1.66 for the log-linear model in the FDI level).  This was 
also the case for the different categories of investment shown in Figure 2 below. 
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add to a country’s gross assets, so that for practical purposes mergers and acquisitions are not 
included, for which different motives apply (Basile, 2004).6  The EIM identifies the location 
decision, which is otherwise difficult to ascertain.7  It gives the characteristics of each project, 
including activity, ownership and scale, where the jobs are known for 62% of projects (the 
investment expenditure for only a third).  National agencies, financial information providers 
and media outlets are used to construct the EIM (Defever, 2012) and Ernst and Young (2012) 
claim to monitor 20,000 data sources, contacting most firms to validate the data.  
The EIM identifies 35,105 projects in the EU25 over 1997-2010, with each country 
receiving FDI in each year.  Two-thirds of the projects are greenfield FDI and the remainder 
are brownfield FDI, where the latter include the plant consolidations that lead to expansions.8  
About 60% of projects are in manufacturing, and the main (ultimate) country of ownership is 
the EU15 (46%), followed by the Americas (34%; mainly the USA) and Asia (12%; Japan).  
Other investment is primarily from elsewhere in Europe, with just 1% from the CEECs. 
 
 [Table 2 and Figure 1 here] 
 
The CEECs received a fifth of the projects over 1997-2010, and Table 2 shows its location by 
country.  About 60% of FDI is in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, which had strong 
transitions over the 1990s (Resmini, 2000).  The Helsinki Group receives less FDI, but these 
entered the process later due to their weaker liberalization, of which Bulgaria and Romania 
had difficult privatizations (Kalotay, 2008).  Generally, the increase in the number of projects 
after membership is much greater for Helsinki Group, and while the mean job scale is similar 
                                                        
6 The EIM excludes portfolio investment and license agreements, but includes a small number of joint ventures.  
It is narrower than the UNCTAD definition.  It does not include extraction, utility, retail and leisure activities. 
Neither does it include Cyprus and Malta prior to their membership, but these received little relevant FDI. 
7 Aggregate FDI data are in net terms and include ‘special purpose entities’ that act as holding companies for tax 
purposes, accounting for up to 90% of FDI in some EU15 countries (OECD, 2014). The correlation between the 
aggregate EIM and UNCTAD data is 0.86 for annual FDI inflows, notwithstanding the different definitions. 
8 Plant closures and investment foregone are not observed.  Further, plant consolidation could involve a location 
at a wholly new site, which is greenfield investment, although these are likely to be small in number. 
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for the Luxembourg Group it is larger for the countries that get more projects.  The FDI share 
for the CEECs is plotted over time in Figure 1.  This peaks for the Luxembourg Group when 
they joined the EU in 2004 and likewise for Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. The share of FDI 
in the CEECs from the EU15 is 62%, and surprisingly this hardly varies by year. 
 
4.1. Accession Variables 
 
The EUit accession dummies are coded to unity for all years after an event.  This includes the 
year of the event if it is in the first six calendar months.  They are zero for the EU15, but this 
is without significance as (1) includes country fixed effects.  On the same basis dummies are 
added for 1, 2 and 3 years after membership to help interpret the results. The ‘time-to-plan’ 
lag from planning to construction can be substantial, but the projects are dated by the year of 
announcement, for which the ‘time-to-build’ lag is much shorter (Millar et al., 2012).  The 
accession events span nine years and no event has the same date across all the CEECs (Table 
1).  Of the fourteen years covered by the data CEEC membership is on average observed for 
half this, i.e. 6.4 years.  The EIM was not produced prior to 1997.  A positive and significant 
 estimate indicates that an event caused FDI to increase over its previous share or level. 
 
4.2. Country Variables 
 
The xit controls in equation (1) are measured for each country.  Details of their expected sign, 
source and measurement are given in Appendix B.  Using a conditional logit model Serwicka 
et al. (2017) show that the motives for FDI location differ between the EU15 and CEECs, so 
that these estimates are allowed to vary between these.  Correlation coefficients are given in 
Serwicka et al. (2016) and are nearly always less than 0.40, but multicollinearity is explored 
by dropping terms.  The estimates for the accession terms without the xit are given below and 
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a broadly similar pattern is found.  The controls are external to the firm, but internal sources 
of heterogeneity such as from greenfield and manufacturing FDI are considered below. 
A market potential term is included to capture European market access: 
 




ij
j ijj
jt
it
ds
GDP
EU25
PotentialMarketEU .   (4) 
 
This is measured for each country i and year t, where GDPjt is the GDP of country j, dij is the 
distance between the capital cities of i and j, and sj is the intra-country distance of j, given by 
the radius of a disk with the same land area (Amiti and Javorcik, 2008).  It supposes that the 
capital city is a functional centroid and that the inter-country distance proxies transport costs, 
as measured by the AA Route Planner.  An alternative measure performs poorly for the EU15 
(Head and Mayer, 2004).  This does not allow for border effects, which is reasonable for the 
EU15 as these are in the Single Market throughout.  In the case of the CEECs it is interacted 
with EU membership, which allows for the possibility that countries closer to the ‘West-East’ 
border gain more FDI.  The national GDP level and growth rate are also included. 
 The production costs are captured by the manufacturing wage rate, while like Resmini 
(2000) general labour availability is measured by the unemployment rate.  The secondary and 
tertiary education rates are included for each of semi- and high-skilled labour, where negative 
signs for both these capture unskilled labour.  Institutional quality is proxied by a composite 
index for political risk (Busse and Hefeker, 2007), where a higher value indicates lower risk.  
The index captures relatively low risks in the EU25, such as a weaker regulatory regime, that 
may be viewed favourably (Bevan and Estrin, 2004).  The corporate tax rate is added for rent 
seeking and the EU Structural Funds as it is used to support infrastructure. 
 A range of integration terms is included, where these may differ in their sign between 
the EU15 and CEECs (see Serwicka et al., 2016).  Association Agreements are picked-up by 
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a trade liberalization term for trade openness.  The ‘MNE / exporters / domestics’ paradigm 
implies that trade and FDI are substitutes (Neary, 2008), but Carstensen and Toubal (2004) 
find complementarity for the CEECs in the transition period, which is when a firm may test a 
market by exporting.  It includes imports and so does not simply capture the export-platform 
motive.  A dummy is included for Eurozone membership, which reduces bilateral transaction 
costs and could stimulate FDI, perhaps by giving confidence to investors in the CEECs, but it 
could also promote exports and so reduce FDI if these are substitutes.  The exchange rate also 
has an ambiguous effect as an increase makes exports more costly, while increasing the value 
of repatriated profits.  It is deflated by the consumer price index, so that it also captures a loss 
of international competitiveness from inflation.  Finally, exchange rate volatility is included. 
 
5. REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
5.1. EU Membership 
 
The likelihood function in equation (2) is regressed as a panel across i = 25 countries and t = 
14 years from 1997 to 2010, giving n = 350 observations.  Initially, it is with the membership 
term only, but subsequently all of the accession events are included, which are then examined 
for the more- and less-liberalized countries.  The regression results with the membership term 
are presented for the FDI share ( ≠ 0) and level ( = 0) in the first two columns of Table 3.  
In each case the u estimates are insignificant, which suggests that there is no inefficiency in 
FDI data collection prior to or after EU membership, so that these terms are omitted.9   
The country controls are included for the EU25, but with slope dummies on each term 
for the CEECs.  In general, it can be seen that they have the same signs between the share and 
                                                        
9 When EU membership is omitted the u coefficients are significant, but this gives confidence in the approach.  
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level equations in columns I and II of Table 3, and that up to half of the terms are significant.  
They show that there are a large number of significant differences in these between the EU15 
and CEECs and that the sign can differ, but consistent with our above prior expectations.  Of 
interest, EU market potential has a positive effect in the CEECs and the wage rate is negative, 
so that these are a low-cost-export platform, but otherwise these are essentially uninteresting 
controls.10  Trade and FDI are substitutes in the CEECs, which is counter to Carstensen and 
Toubal (2004), but consistent with the MNE / exporters / domestics paradigm. 
 
 [Table 3 here] 
 
Columns I and II show that EU membership has positive and significant effects on the share 
and level of FDI location in the CEECs.  When evaluated they are 28% and 89% respectively 
(e.g. exp 0.635 - 1 = 0.89).  As expected, the share estimate is less than that for the level, but 
the extent to which FDI is diverted to the CEECs is evaluated below for the full model. 
 The remainder of Table 3 examines the effect of different estimating equations.  Each 
supposes  = 0 in (1).  Column III imposes a normal error term with constant variance, so that 
the OLS coefficient estimates are obtained.  Compared to column II the membership estimate 
is robust.11  Column IV uses the logistic function and again similar results are found for the 
membership and other terms.  Finally, column V includes the time fixed effects and as noted 
above it gives a similar membership result to the share regression in column I.  It does not 
support the inclusion of these fixed effects since some estimates are unsatisfactory, such as 
negative effects for EU market access and national GDP.  It is probably because there is little 
variation in the controls over time for each country, making their inclusion inappropriate. 
 
                                                        
10 When interacted with EU membership, EU market potential term is significant at the 10% level in column II. 
11 The model in equation (1) with  = 0 was also regressed directly using OLS with the standard errors clustered 
at the country level.  This gives identical parameter estimates.  EU membership continues to be significant at the 
1% level, but some country terms lose significance including the wage rate and Structural Fund terms. 
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5.2. EU Accession Events 
 
Column VI of Table 4 estimates the share equation in column I with all four accession terms 
and column VII includes the post-accession terms for up to three years after EU membership.  
These are repeated in columns VIII and IX for the model in the level ( = 0).  Each includes 
the country controls and they allow the error variance to vary with accession according to the 
events identified in Table 1, although neither is reported to save space.  The accession terms 
estimate the effect across all CEECs and they give a similar pattern for the share and level.  
FDI increases with the commitment to enlarge and at membership, but falls away two years 
after EU membership.  The peak at membership suggests the lag length is about right.   
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
The remainder of Table 4 carries out robustness checks, which again is for the level model.  
First, column X omits the country controls, and while the membership is reasonably robust to 
this, the announcement terms are now greater than the respective estimates in column IX.  As 
the first of these is most affected it suggests that the controls are advantageous in picking-up 
the events prior to this time, such as the trade liberalization and other measures taken to enter 
the negotiations.  Second, column XI includes time fixed effects, but like columns I and V the 
membership estimate is similar to the share regression, although the announcement terms are 
insignificant.  Third, column XII regresses the model for FDI that originates from the EU15. 
Since the Association Agreements largely removed the EU15 tariffs and non-tariff barriers on 
CEEC goods prior to membership, this helps to control for the common EU external tariff at 
EU membership.  Once again there is a positive and significant effect for membership, which 
at 151.2% (= exp 0.921 - 1) is much greater than that for all FDI, at 97.8% in column IX.  As 
a final exercise, column XIII regresses equation (1) using OLS, clustering the standard errors 
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at the country level.  This gives similar parameter estimates to the comparable ML model in 
column IX, while like elsewhere some of the announcement terms are significant. 
 
5.3. More- and Less-Liberalized Countries 
 
To draw inferences about the hypothesis, the accession terms are estimated separately for the 
Luxembourg and Helsinki Groups in Table 5, where these are the more- and less-liberalized 
CEECs respectively.  Column XIV gives the result for the FDI shares.  As noted above, there 
could be a simultaneity bias between ln FDIit and ln FDIt in equation (1), but excluding the 
larger host countries of France, Germany and the UK from column XIV the estimates for the 
membership term are qualitatively similar.  The ln FDIt estimate is greater than unity due to 
the strong growth of FDI in CEECs with small FDI shares (Table 2), but it is not significantly 
different from unity.  Column XV shows that the membership parameter estimates are greater 
if  is constrained equal to unity, but those in column XIV are preferred as they are consistent 
with column VII in which  is also freely estimated.  Finally, column XVI reports the results 
for the FDI level, and again the membership estimates are greater than for the FDI share. 
 
 [Table 5 here] 
 
The respective estimates on the EU accession terms in Table 5 are evaluated in Table 6 along 
with those for all CEECs, where each is expressed in cumulative terms relative to the period 
prior to the accession negotiations.  Across all CEECs they show that FDI more than doubled 
by membership whether it is measured as a share or level (127.2% and 172.6% respectively).  
The key announcement is the commitment to enlarge, although its effect is generally smaller 
than the membership accession event.  In either case, FDI location falls away about two years 
after membership, and this is more pronounced for the share than for the level.  
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Table 6 shows important differences in the accession events between the Luxembourg 
and Helsinki Groups.  First, accession as a whole has much stronger effects on FDI location 
in the Helsinki Group by EU membership whether it is the share or level.  Indeed, three years 
after membership its FDI share nearly doubles, at 86.6%, whereas for the Luxembourg Group 
it is only 8.9% higher.  Second, and related this, the announcements have stronger effects in 
the Helsinki Group, so that by the end of the negotiations FDI location nearly doubles in both 
the share and level, at 87.9% and 76.3% respectively.  By contrast, FDI in the Luxembourg 
Group is largely unresponsive to the announcements, at 20.1% and 0.0% respectively. 
 
 [Table 6 here] 
 
Finally, in relation to EU membership the FDI location effect is stronger for the Luxembourg 
Group compared to the Helsinki Group.  Calculated relative to the end of the negotiations, 
and so directly from Table 5, the respective increases in FDI location in the membership year 
for the Luxembourg and Helsinki Groups are 46.2% and 38.8% for the FDI share but 131.6% 
and 78.1% for the level.12  Again, larger effects are found for the level compared to the share.  
If evaluated they reveal that just over 40% of projects are diverted to the Luxembourg Group 
from elsewhere in the EU25 at membership, but which is even higher for the Helsinki Group 
at about 70%.13  Since the diversion of FDI relates to the EU25 as a whole, and the Helsinki 
Group acceded after the Luxembourg Group (Table 1), then it is consistent with the Helsinki 
Group drawing FDI away from the Luxembourg Group.  Overall, the estimates indicate that 
about 60% of FDI at EU membership was diverted within the EU25 to the CEECs.14 
At the mean project gross job size shown in Table 2 the estimates reveal that an extra 
                                                        
12 From column XVI of Table 5 we find exp 0.577 - 1 = 78.1%.  This can be reconciled with the cumulative FDI 
effects shown in Table 6 by noting that (213.9% + 1) / (76.3% + 1) = 78.1% + 1. 
13 Appendix A shows that the ratio of the estimated coefficients for the FDI level and share is 1 + a / n, implying 
that a = {(2.316 / 1.462) - 1} × n  0.58 n for the Luxembourg Group but a = 0.28 n for the Helsinki Group, 
where in the former case exp 0.840 = 2.316 and exp 0.380 = 1.462 for EU membership from Table 5. 
14 From Table 4, we get a = {(exp 0.682 / exp 0.350) - 1} × n  0.39 n. 
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85 projects and 19,250 jobs located in each Luxembourg country in the membership year and 
that 26 projects and 6,150 jobs located in each Helsinki country at that time, which is about a 
third of that in the Luxembourg Group.15  These seems large when compared with the annual 
number of projects given in Table 2, but Table 6 shows that FDI subsequently fell away. 
 
 [Figure 2 here] 
  
To examine heterogeneity, Figure 2 plots the evaluated coefficients for different categories of 
investment for each of the Luxembourg and Helsinki Groups.  These are in cumulative terms 
for the level regression.  They include the final two columns of Table 6, FDI originating from 
the EU15, which as noted above helps control for the external tariff, and in the latter case for 
manufacturing, greenfield and brownfield FDI.  The manufacturing FDI plot closely follows 
that for all FDI, although after membership there is a divergence and this suggests that FDI 
from outside the EU15 became more important.  Figure 2 shows that brownfield FDI is more 
important for FDI location in the Luxembourg Group, but that greenfield FDI matters more 
for the Helsinki Group.  It reflects the greater liberalization of the Luxembourg Group, which 
entered the accession process earlier and so received brownfield FDI at EU membership.  By 
contrast, the Helsinki Group tended to receive greenfield investment at membership. 
 
5.4. Discussion of the Results 
 
The results are consistent with Clausing and Dorobantu (2005), who find that announcements 
prior to the negotiations are important for FDI in the Helsinki Group only.  Bevan and Estrin 
(2004) find a stronger FDI effect for the Luxembourg Group in the run-up to EU membership 
but this is for 1994-2000, so that it may just capture the effect of the Association Agreements.  
                                                        
15 The mean annual projects per country for the Luxembourg Group is 64.7 (= 4530 / 5 × 14 from Table 2), and 
multiplied by the FDI increase at membership of 131.6% gives 85.1 projects.  The mean number of jobs is 226, 
which gives 19,250 total jobs.  For the Helsinki Group these are 33.6 × 78.1% = 26.2 projects and 6,150 jobs. 
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We find that FDI location in the CEECs falls substantially after membership, which is a new 
finding, and we believe that this is not due to a global event such as the 2008 Financial Crisis.  
This is because it is evident for the FDI share, while in the case of the Luxembourg Group it 
pre-dates the Financial Crisis.  It could just reflect an uncoordinated first-mover response to 
EU enlargement, with FDI then settling down to its new long-run equilibrium level. 
 As regards the hypothesis, the results indicate that the lower border costs from Single 
Market access affect FDI location at membership.  This is because they are inconsistent with 
alternative explanations.  In particular, they do not suggest that FDI anticipates membership, 
as this date was announced at the end of negotiations and it does not significantly affect FDI 
location for either of the two groups shown in Table 5.  Indeed, each announcement has a 
weak effect for the Luxembourg Group.  Further, the results do not suggest that membership 
is simply a commitment to the future liberalization of the CEECs as a larger EU membership 
effect is found for the more-liberalized Luxembourg Group.  A commitment to liberalization 
for the less-liberalized Helsinki Group appears to have occurred earlier in the process as the 
commitment to enlarge has a significant effect on FDI location in these countries.   
The interpretation that EU membership captures the effect of the lower border costs is 
plausible, as FDI is mobile and it is likely to wait until the lower trade costs are effective to 
take advantage of this.  The lower border costs mainly comprise the reduction in waiting time 
and administrative costs from the elimination of border checks, which are reckoned to have 
reduced trade costs between the CEECs and the ‘old’ Europe by around ten per cent. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper explores the effect of EU accession on FDI location in the accession countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe in order to examine the effect of the lower border costs.  Overall, 
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it finds that EU membership had a substantial effect on the FDI location in the CEECs, which 
more than doubled the number of the projects locating in these countries compared to before 
the commencement of the accession negotiations.  This effect varies greatly with a country’s 
liberalization, as captured by the date it was allowed to enter into the accession negotiations.  
In particular, it is three-times greater for the more-liberalized CEECs in terms of the number 
of both projects and jobs, while there is strong growth in FDI in the run-up to membership for 
the less-liberalized CEECs, consistent their greater liberalization as part of the enlargement 
process.  In general, the results show that the lower border costs can have substantial effects 
on FDI location, which depends crucially on the liberalization of the host economy. 
The methodology pursued in the paper reveals that about 60% of the projects locating 
in the CEECs at membership were diverted to the CEECs from the existing Member States, 
so that the net effect for the enlarged EU as a whole is much smaller.  This is even greater for 
the less-liberalized CEECs that entered the EU accession process later, for which greenfield 
FDI is much more important, but consistent with the CEECs operating as an export-platform 
for the ‘old’ Member States.  By contrast, brownfield FDI is relatively more important for the 
more-liberalized CEECs and this may reflect the plant consolidations at EU membership.  An 
implication of the paper is that the existing literature on the fifth enlargement, which focuses 
on the period prior to membership, has mainly captured its liberalizing effect.  Finally, while 
at the time of writing the nature of Brexit is yet to be determined, a further implication of the 
paper is that higher trade costs will adversely affect FDI location throughout the EU. 
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Table 1: Key EU Accession Events for CEECs 
 
Accession event 
‘Luxembourg Group’ ‘Helsinki Group’ 
Estonia, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovenia 
1: Latvia, 
Lithuania 
and Slovakia 
2: Bulgaria and 
Romania 
Commencement of negotiations 31st Mar 1998 15th Feb 2000 15th Feb 2000 
Commitment to enlargement 15th Dec 2001 15th Dec 2001 13th Dec 2002 
Conclusion of negotiations 13th Dec 2002 13th Dec 2002 17th Dec 2004 
EU membership 1st May 2004 1st May 2004 1st Jan 2007 
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Table 2: Location of FDI Projects in the CEECs, 1997-2010 
 
  
Total Projects Mean Annual Projects 
Mean  
Project 
Gross 
Job Size 
  
Number 
EU25 
Share  
(%) 
Before EU 
Membership 
After EU 
Membership 
Number 
EU25 
Share 
(%) 
Number 
EU25 
Share 
(%) 
        
Luxembourg Group: 4,530 12.90 267 9.79 381 16.60 226 
Estonia 234 0.67 15 0.56 18 0.80 89 
Czech Republic 1,152 3.28 73 2.66 92 4.01 260 
Hungary 1,413 4.03 95 3.49 107 4.66 218 
Poland 1,613 4.59 81 2.97 150 6.52 232 
Slovenia 118 0.34 3 0.11 14 0.60 123 
        
Helsinki Group: 2,350 6.70 133 6.30 248 7.93 234 
Latvia 181 0.52 10 0.35 16 0.71 61 
Lithuania 239 0.68 12 0.45 22 0.95 99 
Slovakia 529 1.51 19 0.70 57 2.46 306 
Bulgaria 470 1.34 42 2.19 45 1.11 202 
Romania 931 2.65 50 2.61 108 2.69 258 
        
CEECs: 6,880 19.60 400 16.09 629 24.53 224 
EU15: 28,225 80.40 2,086 83.91 1,935 75.47 80 
Notes: Jobs are known for 62% of all projects. 
Source: EIM dataset. 
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Table 3: Results for EU Membership 
 
 Share Level OLS Logistic Function Time Fixed Effects 
Dependent variable: ln (FDIit / FDIt) ln FDIit ln FDIit ln (FDIit / (FDIt - FDIit)) ln FDIit 
Column: I II III IV V 
vit:  Constant v 0.276*** 0.295*** 0.268*** 0.279*** 0.262*** 
     EU membership v -0.057*** -0.063*** - -0.054*** -0.053** 
      
EU membership 0.244*** 0.635*** 0.606*** 0.218*** 0.188** 
Country controls xit-1: EU25 CEECs EU25 CEECs EU25 CEECs EU25 CEECs EU25 CEECs 
EU market potential (x 10-3) -6.524 43.916* -1.500 26.631 -1.500 21.871 -7.367 45.748* -28.228*** -14.259 
Host GDP (x 10-6) -0.029 -1.220*** 0.0278 -1.450*** 0.028 -1.570*** -0.039 -1.220*** -0.066** -1.290*** 
Host GDP growth rate (x 10-2) 0.292 2.692*** 0.853 1.873 0.853 2.034 0.113 2.940** -0.947 4.015*** 
Real wage rate (x 10-2) -5.004*** -11.293** -5.413*** -9.291* -5.413*** -9.154* -5.739*** -10.922** -10.477*** -1.897 
Secondary education (x 10-2) 1.577*** -0.262 1.683** -1.014 1.683** -1.208 1.502** -0.145 0.963* -0.353 
Higher education (x 10-2) 2.285*** -0.410 4.272*** -2.556** 4.272*** -2.374* 2.269*** -0.358 0.376 0.143 
Labour availability (x 10-2) -2.021* 7.676*** -0.218 5.777*** -0.218 5.812*** -2.414** 8.129*** -1.831 7.371*** 
Institutional quality (x 10-2) 0.689 -1.652 2.155*** -3.293*** 2.155*** -3.341*** 0.640 -1.541 0.478 -1.031 
Corporate tax rate (x 10-2) -0.215 -2.897*** -0.766 -2.847*** -0.766 -3.152*** -0.252 -2.918*** 0.712 -3.466*** 
EU Structural Funds 0.019 0.165** 0.057* 0.166** 0.057* 0.174** 0.013 0.169** 0.018 0.198** 
Trade liberalization (x10-2) 3.192 -8.158* 5.721* -8.754* 5.721* -7.530 3.591 -8.718** 2.841 -6.310 
Eurozone membership -0.015 0.783*** -0.138* 0.977*** -0.138* 1.036*** -0.006 0.777*** -0.154* 1.045*** 
Exchange rate (x 10-2) -0.338 -0.240 1.482*** -2.163*** 1.482*** -2.066*** -0.338 -0.166 0.508 -1.085* 
Exchange rate volatility (x 10-2) -0.727 0.723 -0.222 0.212 -0.222 0.215 -0.820 0.817 -2.381** 2.392** 
ln FDIt -0.061 - - - - 
Constant  -2.493** 3.288*** 3.316*** -2.590*** 7.469*** 
n 350 350 350 350 350 
Log-likelihood 519.3 478.4 322.8 503.5 554.3 
Notes: ML estimation of (1), (2) and (3), with u = 0 and  = 0 in columns II to V.  Country fixed effects included throughout.  *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10%. 
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Table 4: Results for the EU Accession Process 
 
Dependent variable: ln FDIit Share Level Level 
Origin countries: All All All All All All EU15 All 
Column: VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII 
EUit-1:         
Negotiations commence 0.317*** 0.199** 0.162* 0.110* 0.236** -0.002 0.181* 0.116 
Commitment to enlarge 0.321*** 0.272*** 0.234* 0.211* 0.239* 0.169 0.184* 0.187* 
Negotiations conclude -0.097 -0.169 0.004 -0.019 -0.012 -0.120 -0.110 -0.012 
EU membership 0.286*** 0.350*** 0.626*** 0.682*** 0.623*** 0.270** 0.921*** 0.686*** 
Membership + 1 year - -0.127* - -0.061* 0.003 -0.006 -0.071 -0.064 
Membership + 2 years - -0.274*** - -0.147* -0.243*** -0.337*** -0.272** -0.156** 
Membership + 3 years - -0.118 - -0.009 -0.068 -0.153 -0.077 -0.001 
ln FDIt -0.011 0.097 - - - - -  
Constant  -3.406*** -3.425*** 2.896*** 3.155*** 3.073*** 7.448*** 3.505*** 3.165** 
Country controls xit-1? Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects? No No No No No Yes No No 
n 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 
Log-likelihood 532.3 542.2 491.2 493.3  363.6 569.6 350.1 - 
R2 - - - - - - - 0.93 
Notes: ML estimation of (2) with (1), (3) and u = 0 in columns VI to XII, and OLS estimation of (1) with clustered standard errors at a country level in column XIII.  
Columns VIII to XIII set  = 0 in (1).  Country fixed effects included throughout.  *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10%. 
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Table 5: Results for the Luxembourg and Helsinki Groups 
 
 Share Level 
Column: XIV XV XVI 
EUit-1: Luxembourg Helsinki Luxembourg Helsinki Luxembourg Helsinki 
Negotiations commence 0.042 0.298** 0.050 0.305*** -0.092 0.226* 
Commitment to enlarge 0.183* 0.333** 0.053 0.308* 0.071 0.341** 
Negotiations conclude -0.077 -0.201 -0.062 -0.180 -0.050 0.040 
EU membership 0.380** 0.328** 0.563*** 0.349** 0.840*** 0.577*** 
Membership + 1 year -0.248* 0.006 -0.242* 0.015 -0.180* 0.072 
Membership + 2 years -0.229* -0.335** -0.205 -0.319** -0.046 -0.272** 
Membership + 3 years -0.157 -0.097 -0.136 -0.064 -0.101 0.036 
ln FDIt  1.086 = 1 = 0 
Constant  -3.114*** -2.750*** 3.480*** 
n 350 350 350 
Log-likelihood 544.9  496.9 497.8 
Notes: ML estimation of (2) with (1) and (3), where u = 0.  EUit-1 terms in spline form for Luxembourg and Helsinki Groups in Table 1.  Country 
controls for CEECs and EU15 and country fixed effects included but not reported.  *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10%. 
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Table 6: Evaluation of Cumulative FDI Location Effect 
 
 Share Level 
Accession event 
All 
CEECs 
(%) 
Luxembourg 
Group 
(%) 
Helsinki 
Group 
(%) 
All 
CEECs 
(%) 
Luxembourg 
Group 
(%) 
Helsinki 
Group 
(%) 
Negotiations commence 22.0 0.0 34.7 11.6 0.0 25.3 
Commitment to enlarge 60.2 20.1 87.9 37.9 0.0 76.3 
Negotiations conclude 60.2 20.1 87.9 37.9 0.0 76.3 
EU membership 127.2 75.6 160.9 172.6 131.6 213.9 
Membership + 1 year 100.2 37.0 160.9 156.5 93.4 213.9 
Membership + 2 years 52.2 8.9 86.6 121.4 93.4 139.2 
Membership + 3 years 52.2 8.9 86.6 121.4 93.4 139.2 
Notes: Cumulative % change in FDI relative to before negotiations.  Based on columns VII and IX of Table 4 and 
XIV and XVI of Table 5 (e.g. All CEECs FDI share at membership from column VII is exp (0.199 + 0.272 - 0.169 + 
0.350) - 1 = 113.2% in above table).  Significant changes shown only and the groups defined in Table 1. 
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Figure 1: FDI Shares in the CEECs 
 
 
Notes: Groups defined in Table 1.   
Source: EIM dataset. 
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Figure 2: Effect of EU Accession Process by FDI Type 
 
(a) Luxembourg Group 
 
 
 
(b) Helsinki Group 
 
 
Notes: Estimation of column XVI for projects with different characteristics originating from EU15.  A 
small number of joint-owned projects from different global regions excluded.  Zero project counts are 
increased by one and cases of a single project increased by one to ensure normality.  Coefficients 
evaluated in cumulative terms, as in Table 6.  Groups and accession events defined in Table 1.  
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Commence Commit Conclude Member +1 year +2 years +3 years
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
p
ro
je
ct
s 
(%
 c
u
m
. 
ch
g
e.
)
Accession Events
All FDI EU15 FDI EU15 manufacturing FDI
EU15 'greenfield' FDI EU15 'brownfield' FDI
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Commence Commit Conclude Member +1 year +2 years +3 yearsN
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
p
ro
je
ct
s 
(%
 c
u
m
. 
ch
g
e.
)
Accession Events
All FDI EU15 FDI EU15 manufacturing FDI
EU15 'greenfield' FDI EU15 'brownfield' FDI
 30 
Appendix A: The Measured Effect and ‘Diverted’ FDI 
 
 EU15 CEECs 
Proportionate change in CEECs 
Level Share 
Prior to accession m n - m - - 
Case I: ‘Diverted’ FDI m - d n - m + d 1+
d
n-m
 1+
d
n-m
 
Case II: ‘Additional’ FDI m n - m + a 1+
a
n-m
 
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Notes: For Case III the proportionate change for the level is (n - m + d + a) / (n - m), while that for the share is 
{(n - m + d + a) / (n + a)} / {(n - m) / n}, from which the Cases I and II follow (i.e. a = 0 or d = 0). 
 
Suppose there are n FDI projects in the EU25 prior to accession, of which m (< n) are in the 
EU15.  Three accession cases are shown in the table: Case I: d (< m) projects are ‘diverted’ to 
the CEECs from the EU15; Case II: a ‘additional’ projects locate in the CEECs that are a net 
increase in FDI to the EU25; and Case III: both of these.  In terms of the proportionate effect, 
the table shows that the level and share give the same effect for Case I, and that Cases I and II 
are observationally equivalent for the level.  However, the level gives a larger effect than the 
share for Case II, which is the same if FDI is both ‘diverted’ and ‘additional’, as in Case III.  
In these latter cases the ratio of the level to the share is 1 + a / n, which is unity only if a = 0, 
so FDI is wholly ‘diverted’.  These are for the CEECs as a group, but dividing the numerator 
and denominator of each expression by the number of CEECs yields identical results. 
  
 31 
Appendix B: The Data 
 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max. 
Expected 
sign 
Foreign direct investment:      
FDIit 100.3 144.0 1 818  
ln FDIit 3.82 1.33 0 6.71  
ln (FDIit / i FDIit) -3.98 1.30 -7.79 -1.09  
ln (i FDIit) 7.80 0.23 7.45 8.09  
Accession dummies, EUit:      
Commencement of negotiations 0.34 0.47 0 1 + 
Commitment to enlargement 0.25 0.43 0 1 + 
Conclusion to negotiations 0.22 0.41 0 1 + 
Membership 0.18 0.39 0 1 + 
Membership + 1 year 0.15 0.36 0 1 + 
Membership + 2 years 0.13 0.33 0 1 + 
Membership + 3 years 0.10 0.30 0 1 + 
Country control variables, xit:      
EU market potential (€ bn / km) 36.56 15.65 14.54 83.91 + 
Host GDP (€ bn) 418.7 612.3 6.06 2,400 + 
Host GDP growth rate (%) 2.98 3.81 -17.7 11.7 + 
Wage rate (€) 13.80 11.81 0 80.2 - 
Secondary education rate (%) 50.59 15.60 10.8 80.2 ? 
Higher education rate (%) 20.58 8.02 2.31 42.61 ? 
Labour availability (%) 8.45 3.90 1.8 22.1 + 
Institutional quality (index, 1 to 100) 81.58 7.07 65 96.5 ? 
Corporate tax rate (%) 29.07 8.25 10.0 56.8 - 
EU Structural Funds (€ bn) 1.24 1.87 0 9.80 + 
Trade liberalization (%) 77.76 33.94 27.1 186.3 ? 
Eurozone membership (dummy) 0.42 0.49 0 1 ? 
Exchange rate (2005 = 100) 97.29 10.28 53.8 134.3 ? 
Exchange rate volatility 9.33 69.17 0.02 1090 ? 
 
Data Measurement and Source: 
Controls are sourced from Eurostat, unless otherwise stated, with monetary units in euros at 
2005 prices using an EU deflator.  Those not described in table or text are as follows.  Wage 
rate is hourly compensation in manufacturing (International Labor Comparisons, US Bureau 
of Labor Statistics); not known for Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Romania and 
Slovenia, for which an unreported dummy is included.  Highest educational attainment of 25-
64 year-olds at ISCED levels 3-4 and 5-6 (World Bank). Institutional quality (International 
Country Risk Guide, Political Risk Services); zero risk = 100.  Trade liberalization is (exports 
+ imports) / GDP (International Financial Statistics, IMF).  Real effective exchange rate for 
36 major trading partners. Volatility is absolute change in exchange rate in preceding year. 
Tax is adjusted top statutory corporate tax rate (DG for Taxation and Customs Union, 
European Commission).  EU Structural Funds outturn (DG for Regional Policy).  
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